CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 16 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

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The PRESIDENT: The 495th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

At the outset, I should like to extend a cordial welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, who is addressing this plenary meeting. In doing so, I should like to recall that he made a significant contribution to the success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons as an Acting Chairman of the Committee of the Whole. I should also like to note the long-time active participation and valuable contribution of Finland, a non-member, in the work of the Conference. I am sure that the members will follow the statement of His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State with particular interest.

The Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Sri Lanka and Romania. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Finland. I invite His Excellency Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to address the Conference.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, permit me to thank you for the warm words of welcome you have just extended to me. I am very pleased and honoured to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. Let me also express my pleasure at seeing you occupy the Chair of the Conference. I know that under your competent guidance, the Conference will work effectively.

Chemical disarmament has gained new urgency on the agenda of the world community. Alarm at the proliferation and use of chemical weapons is global. The 149 participating States at the Paris Conference in January aired their common awareness of this danger. It marked a unique expression of political resolve by virtually all States of the world. The Declaration of the Paris Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament to conclude the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons by redoubling its efforts on this issue. The present global alarm now provides a momentum which this negotiating body should not fail to seize. If this Conference succeeds in these efforts, it will give a new impetus for multilateral disarmament as a whole.

There is now an increasing understanding of the scope of the chemical weapons problem. Many countries are taking measures to strengthen export controls on chemicals, equipment and facilities which may be used in the production of chemical weapons. International trade in this kind of merchandise has to be put under scrutiny. But this alone is not enough to stop the spread of chemical weapons. Finland welcomes the Soviet Union's announcement at the Paris Conference that she will unilaterally start the elimination of her chemical weapon stockpiles. We also welcome the recent

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statement by the United States that she plans to explore ways of ensuring the accelerated withdrawal of her chemical weapon stockpile from the Federal Republic of Germany.

These kinds of unilateral measures are encouraging signs. They help to strengthen the momentum which is further highlighted by developments in other areas of disarmament efforts. The Soviet Union and the United States are expected soon to resume their nuclear and space talks. Deep reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals will be a vital element in making the world safer. In Europe, two parallel sets of negotiations on military security within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe started only a week ago. In addition to the continued work on confidence- and security-building measures, conventional armed forces in Europe have finally become an object of negotiation.

Disarmament at the bilateral level and in the regional context is advancing. The Conference on Disarmament is responsible for advancement at the multilateral level. Among the first priorities is the completion of the chemical weapons convention. The Paris Conference demonstrated the globality of the chemical weapons question. The effectiveness of the future convention requires universal adherence to the convention from the very beginning. Every country is expected to abide by the provisions of the convention and, therefore, every country that is willing to contribute to the negotiations should have an opportunity to do so. Finland welcomes the decision of the Conference to open its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to new observer States. The restructuring of the work of the Committee is a positive sign that the redoubling of efforts is taking place. We wish the Ad hoc Committee and its Chairman, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, every success in turning the unanimous message of the Paris Conference into reality.

Verification of the future convention is undoubtedly one of the most difficult issues facing the CW negotiations. The Finnish research project on the verification of chemical disarmament - Finland's contribution to the CW negotiations - has for 15 years developed sensitive and selective analytical methods to meet verification requirements of the convention. The results have been published annually here at the Conference on Disarament in the form of "Finnish Blue Books" totalling about 2,500 pages of research data in 13 volumes. These reports contain analytical data on chemical warfare agents, their precursors and degradation products studied using seven instrumental methods. Some of the methods require sophisticated stationary instrumention, but some are also usable in mobile laboratories. Application of the methods for air monitoring was found feasible in on-site, near-site and remote verification tasks.

To make the results more readily available for other laboratories, a computerized verification data base is being prepared. A prototype of this data base was introduced at this Conference last year, and delegations were encouraged to test it by allowing them access to our computer. The ultimate goal is a comprehensive chemical weapons verification data base for the Technical Secretariat. In the first phase, an analytical data base will help the future Preparatory Commission in developing verification methods. We hope to be able to demonstrate its use to the delegations in Geneva during the coming summer session.

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To allow reliable use of the identification data collected into the data base, work within the project has proceeded to describe the numerous methods of sample preparation and analysis required in a way which meets the criteria of standard operating procedures. Concrete international co-operation is vital to the success of the pioneering work towards the standardization of methods. We are pleased to announce to this Conference that we have recently signed an agreement with Switzerland on co-operation in methods development. We are confident that our project will benefit from Swiss scientific expertise.

In order to facilitate international validation of the procedures the Finnish project is planning an inter-laboratory "round robin" exercise. The project will also test the suitability of the methods during the first trial inspection in Finland, which incidentally is taking place today.

Finland has put her capability to verify alleged uses of chemical weapons at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Once the convention has been signed, Finland is also prepared to offer the facilities of her research project to the Technical Secretariat for analytical work. Continuous methods development and updating of chemicals lists will remain important after the convention has entered into force.

In addressing the Paris Conference, Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa announced that, as of next year, Finland is prepared to train each year, free of charge, chemists from the developing world in the use of technical methods and instruments relevant to the verification tasks of the convention. Details of this offer will be worked out before the summer, and invitations will be extended directly to the Governments concerned. Close acquaintance with the technical methods is necessary for every party to the convention that has a chemical industry of its own. National organizations should be able to ensure compliance with the obligations set out in the convention. Acquaintance with the methods would also facilitate the recruitment of staff to the Technical Secretariat on a broad geographical basis.

Let me now turn to another major item on the agenda of this Conference, that is nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. The role of nuclear weapons is being reappraised. The complete prohibition of nuclear tests would be necessary to constrain the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. A cessation of nuclear testing would also strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty, addressing the danger of the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Finland looks forward to the fourth review conference of the NPT next year. We hope that it will allow further steps to strengthen the status of the Treaty as one of the corner-stones of international security. Progress in nuclear test-ban negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as in this body would facilitate the success of the NPT review conference.

Again, progress towards reliable and effective verification is a prerequisite for the success of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE), working under the auspices of the Conference since 1976, has a key role in this respect. In order to make a contribution to the study and development of effective seismic verification methods for a test ban, Finland is actively participating in the

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work of the GSE and maintains for the purpose a seismic verification research programme run by the University of Helsinki and sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Finnish participation is made possible by a sophisticated national network of seismic stations and the requisite expertise. Moreover, the bedrock in Finland offers optimal conditions for seismic detection. With a view to the improved global seismic data exchange system to be presented in the fifth report of the GSE, Finland is completing her own facilities in the framework of her seismic verification research programme.

A new three-component station (VAF) equipped with modern instrumentation designed specially for detection purposes will start operations this spring in western Finland. This station, together with the array station FINSA, with continuous seismic data transmission to the national data centre in Helsinki, are the main elements offered to the global seismic data exchange system to be established for monitoring of a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests.

In addition to this system Finland is participating in co-operation with Norway in a small-aperture seismic array experiment with the FINESA station in southern Finland. A new central computer unit and a continuous on-line data transmission system are to be brought into operation this spring, after which we will be ready to continue experimenting with other small-aperture arrays.

Finland welcomes the plans for large-scale experimental testing of the global seismic data exchange system (GSETT-2) in 1990. Finland is participating actively in the programme for this experiment and its start-up tests. As our contribution to GSETT-2, the computing facilities at the Finnish National Seismic Data Centre in Helsinki have been increased by adding new Sun computers and work stations for receiving, processing and transmitting seismic wave-form and parameter data. At the same time research is going on at the Helsinki NDC on procedures for automatic detection of seismic events. Some preliminary achievements of these studies have been presented at the ongoing GSE meeting.

Particular attention has been given to developing facilities for data transmission so that the seismic data recorded and processed within the Finnish station network can be made available to all interested parties. From the Helsinki NDC the seismic data can easily be transmitted through public networks to other data centres.

Seismic verification facilities are not equally distributed round the globe; in the southern hemisphere the density of seismograph stations is much lower than in the northern hemisphere. In order to improve seismic recording facilities in Africa, Finland has co-operated with Zambia in establishing a seismic network. The main station in Lusaka has the capacity to record, analyse and transmit seismic data, especially from the southern hemisphere, as is indicated by Zambian participation in GSETT-1 in 1984.

In order to strengthen the seismic observation capacity in Africa, Finland, in co-operation with UNESCO and various scientific organizations, conducted a training course for African seismological observers in Lusaka last September. Altogether 32 participants from 15 African countries took part in

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this course. To encourage African countries to participate in the work of GSE, including GSETT-2, the Finnish Government is prepared to increase assistance to the Lusaka seismograph station.

The easing of international tensions, co-operation between major Powers and prospects for the peaceful settlement of many regional conflicts may encourage this body to discuss, beside its substantive work, questions relating to its agenda, procedures and membership. As a non-member State Finland has repeatedly emphasized its continuing active interest in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Our contributions to multilateral disarmament efforts, some of which I have just presented to you, are a record of our commitment. As a neutral country Finland has a permanent interest in disarmament. It is our conviction that countries which are able and willing to participate should have the opportunity to do so fully.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Ambassador Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, for his statement. It was indeed a pleasure for me as a delegate of Japan to welcome you, Sir, who served in Tokyo as Ambassador of Finland and who are such a good friend of Japan. I would also like to thank Your Excellency for the very kind words you addressed to me.

Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I would like to welcome a group of students from Yugoslavia who are observing our session in the public gallery. I thank them for their interest in the work of disarmament, and wish them a very successful and fruitful visit. The next speaker is the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you my warm congratulations as you take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. I should like to express my appreciation to you, as the representative of a country with which the German Democratic Republic shares fruitful relations. I wish you success in the discharge of your responsible duties, and I can assure you of my delegation's fullest support in this endeavour. I am confident that under your able and efficient stewardship the Conference will yield concrete results in the negotiating process. Your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his competence and special negotiating skills which helped create the necessary conditions for resuming our Conference's work.

I should like to introduce at today's plenary session document CD/899, i.e. the report on the national trial inspection of the German Democratic Republic.

In February 1988, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal for the holding of trial inspections in chemical industry facilities in order to expedite work on the draft convention on chemical weapons. This initiative was taken up and developed further by the Ad hoc Committee, resulting in document CD/CW/WP.213. On this basis, the German Democratic Republic carried out a trial inspection in an industrial plant in the autumn of 1988. It was conducted in a multi-purpose pharmaceutical facility, a production unit of the "Dresden" pharmaceutical enterprise, which processes a substance listed

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in schedule [2] as "To be discussed further" - dimethylaminoethanol. The substance is converted into meclophenoxate hydrochloride, a chemical which is used as a medicine.

In preparation for the trial inspection an initial visit - actually a sequence of several visits - was carried out. During the "initial visit period" a facility agreement was negotiated and a document outlining the detailed verification approach was drawn up. The initial visit included four one-day visits to the facility and several weeks for the analysis and study of basic documents to prepare the verification concept and negotiate the facility agreement. The routine verification lasted for two days, while the elaboration of the inspection report took one day.

The following inspection methods were applied: inventory controls by direct measurement, enumeration of standard tanks, verification of records and sampling and analyses for confirmation of data in the material balance declaration and of non-production of schedule [1] chemicals. At the same time, the operating condition and the production régime were checked on the basis of the facility agreement. Moreover, interviews were held with plant workers.

During the inspection two technical principles were investigated, namely material balance verification and anomaly detection. In the case of material balance verification, a narrow inspection mandate was drawn up and successfully implemented, based on the facility agreement and the verification approach. For anomaly detection, it was difficult to formulate a tight inspection mandate.

The facility was notified in advance of the inspection date, mainly because material balance verification, and inventory verification in particular, can only be performed at specific points in the production cycle. Therefore, the time of the inventory verification must be agreed with the operator of the facility, while interim inspections can be conducted at short notice in accordance with the "rolling text". The inspection did not have a major impact on facility operations. But with a view to making facility operations suitable for verification under the convention, some adjustments became necessary, both in facility accounting practice and in the operating régime at the facility. We are looking forward to expert discussions on the experience gathered during trial inspections, to be held in the coming weeks here in Geneva.

Since I have been given the floor, I should like to air some further observations on topical issues concerning current negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The verification problem has attracted great attention in recent consultations. Our delegation welcomes the efforts made in Working Group 1 with respect to the pattern of verification. A conclusion to be drawn from this debate is that the existing elements of verification included in the "rolling text" constitute a solid foundation for a functioning and reliable verification system. Chemicals which are chemical weapons and have little or no use except for CW purposes, as well as key components for binary or multicomponent chemical weapons, are covered under the most stringent régime.

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The second category, key precursors, will also fall under systematic verification by on-site inspection. In both cases, the inspections will have to prove not only that the chemical is not used for other than the declared purposes, but also the absence of any production prohibited by the convention in the facility under inspection. A third category of chemicals will be subject to verification by data monitoring.

At present the question of whether there is a need to supplement these verification system elements is being discussed. We feel that an answer to this question may be found in trying to identify the aim of additional verification measures. It will be easier to make a choice concerning the verification methods to be applied on the basis of this identification. One target for verification is chemicals which are not included in any of the three schedules and which, because of their toxicity or other characteristics, can be diverted to chemical weapons purposes. In addition, the facilities producing these chemicals might be converted into or readily used as CW production facilities. In our view, a solution could perhaps be brought about by including such chemicals in schedule [2]. In so doing, sufficient assurance could be obtained that the chemical in question is not produced for prohibited purposes and the facility not used for CW production. This relates to problems which have been the subject of discussion for some time under the heading "schedule [4]" or "super-toxic lethal chemicals" (STLCs). To arrive at the aforementioned solution, the guidelines for schedule [2] would have to be drafted to allow for the inclusion of such chemicals. The ambivalent characteristics of some chemicals, however, might create difficulties in reaching agreement on whether a specific chemical requires systematic verification or not. For these cases, another pragmatic approach seems to be advisable.

In our opinion it would be sensible for a list to be drawn up comprising those dubious chemicals which cause concern. Requests from States parties should form the basis of such a list, which should be compiled by the Technical Secretariat and communicated to the States parties. The idea of maintaining an open list of this kind was advanced by the delegation of Italy last year. The production of chemicals set forth in this list, probably above a certain threshold, as well as the facilities in which they are produced, would have to be declared by the States parties. Following such declarations, checks could be carried out on an ad hoc basis. The creation of weighting factors, as suggested by the Federal Republic of Germany, could serve as a means of choosing the proper frequency of ad hoc checks. The scientific council whose establishment was proposed by France could assume an advisory role in the overall process. By applying this method, only one point of possible concern would be left unaffected, namely facilities which do not produce chemicals contained in the schedules and are consequently not declared, but which have the capability of being used as or easily converted into a CW production facility. The discussions on this subject did not reveal any possibility of defining sufficiently clear characteristics so that they can be included in a list or a special register. We are ready to discuss further ideas to provide assurances regarding the absence of prohibited activities in such facilities. There is, of course, always the alternative of requesting a challenge inspection.

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Another problem I should like to touch upon concerns the Executive Council. We attach great importance to reaching agreement on the composition of the Executive Council of the future Organization. The work to be accomplished on this subject would, to our mind, also help make headway in other subjects which are linked with the functions of this organ. In working paper CD/812 of 4 March 1988, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic set forth its views on the composition, size and decision-making of the Executive Council. In this approach we proceeded from the fact that the proper implementation of the convention would have a strong bearing on the security interests of the States parties. For this reason, the stability of the convention and its global character will largely depend on the political body acting as the executive organ. The composition of the Executive Council will have to correspond to the character of the convention as a disarmament agreement. That is why its composition should be in accordance with the political balance established in the Conference on Disarmament, as the appropriate multilateral organ to negotiate this kind of agreement. Therefore, the conclusion has been drawn that the principles of political balance and equitable geographical distribution should play a crucial role. In addition, the groups should be made up of an appropriate number of countries with a developed chemical industry as well as those not having a major industry of this kind. We are still of the opinion that this organ, to be effective, should be composed of a limited membership. We deem the figure of 21 adequate.

Since we are now to continue the debate on these issues in the various working groups, I would like to offer some observations on the outcome of discussions held in the meantime. In our view they revealed that the relationship between political balance and equitable geographical distribution, being the governing principles for the composition of the Executive Council, was widely supported. A limited size for this body was also considered essential. Different views have been expressed only concerning whether the stage of development of a chemical industry should be taken into account. We arrived at these conclusions during the consultations held last year in the working group under the chairmanship of Mr. Numata of Japan. The same goes for observations offered on this subject in the plenary. I am referring especially, in this context, to statements made by the delegations of Brazil, France, Pakistan, the United States, Sweden and China last year. The quotations contained in the circulated text of my statement delivered today speak for themselves. 1/

1/ The relevant section of the text circulated by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic read as follows:

"The delegation of Brazil stated on 26 April 1988: 'Three criteria, in our view, could be merged in the definition of eligibility for the

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I believe that this justifies the conviction that there already exists a foundation for elaborating an agreement in principle on the composition of the Executive Council. Following this agreement, the details of a text to be included in article VIII could then be worked out. We value the intention expressed by the Chairman of Working Group 3 to start consultations on this item, and we welcome the fact that this endeavour was also supported by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel of France.

Executive Council: geographical, political and industrial capacity.' The CD was proposed as a model for a 'strong, efficient and representative Executive Council, with a membership in the range between 20 and 30 ...' (CD/PV.460).

"The French delegation stressed in its statement of 17 March 1988 that the composition of the Executive Council should not be 'simply a copy of the usual rules in general political bodies'. The view was expressed that it is 'on the contrary, directly linked to the convention itself and so combines the geographical, the political and the industrial criteria' (CD/PV.449).

"In the statement of the delegation of Pakistan of 28 April 1988, it was stressed that the precise composition of the Executive Council 'should be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and of political balance' (CD/PV.461).

"We appreciate the positive comment made by the United States delegation in its statement of 14 April 1988 concerning our working paper CD/812. In this context, it was stated that 'the Executive Council must be small enough for effective work and yet represent the different interests involved in the convention'. The statement recognized that care must be taken to achieve political balance, and recommended that it should be brought about indirectly. The interrelationship between political balance and decision-making procedures was also stressed (CD/PV.457).

"In its statement of 13 September 1988, the delegation of Sweden expressed the following view: 'The composition of the Executive Council should reflect political balance and equitable geographical distribution.' It was further stated that the wish for special representation of countries carrying a higher burden of routine inspections was understandable (CD/PV.481).

"In its statement of 31 March 1988, the delegation of China recognized 'a convergence of views' on 'the three elements of geographical distribution, chemical industry capacity and political groupings'. We fully share the conviction expressed by China that 'so long as we give full consideration to the above three elements and show mutual compromise and understanding, a composition of the organization compatible with the requirements of the convention will be found' (CD/PV.453)."

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Winding up my statement, I have grounds to reiterate on this occasion what has already been said at SSOD-III, during the Paris Conference, and here in this very room. The German Democratic Republic possesses no chemical weapons and has no such weapons from other States stationed on its territory. It is neither engaged in the development of chemical weapons, nor has it facilities to produce them. The German Democratic Republic advocates an international moratorium on the production of chemical weapons before the entry into force of the convention, and has introduced strict export controls for dual-purpose chemicals. My country continues its efforts towards the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, because this, we feel, will facilitate a global solution.

These measures are truly building confidence. They add, we think, to the successful work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. These steps, in fact, promote the early conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The German Democratic Republic is keeping its word given at the Paris Conference that it will advance these negotiations by displaying a constructive and action-oriented approach and submitting substantive proposals. Our delegation is in favour of focusing these negotiations on the essential issues of the CW convention and achieving a real breakthrough. We do this because the implementation of the Declaration of the Paris Conference will not come about on its own. We do this since concrete action is called for when we are about to seize the chance offered at the Paris Conference, namely to conclude the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic for his statement, and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. The next speaker is the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vajnar.

Mr. VAJNAR (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me first of all cordially welcome you to the presidency of our Conference for the month of March. Your diplomatic skill and kind, flexible, personal approach has already influenced our proceedings positively. We wish you full success in your further work, and I assure you that you may rely on the full support and co-operation of our delegation. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, for his useful work as the President of the Conference in February. Let me also join you in welcoming the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, who addressed the Conference this morning. We listened to his statement with great interest.

As I informed the Conference last month, Czechoslovakia carried out a national trial inspection of a chemical industry facility on 25 and 26 January this year. In my short intervention today I would like to introduce the report on this inspection, contained in what will be document CD/900.

The facility selected for the inspection is a medium-sized plant situated close to the town of Mnísek, producing an agent commercially designated as Spolapret OS which is used mainly for non-flammable treatment of cotton. This substance is produced from phosphorus trichloride, which is converted into

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dimethyl phosphite, these being substances which would under CD/881, be declared schedule [3] chemicals. For the purposes of the inspection these compounds were hypothetically considered as schedule [2] chemicals.

The inspection team was composed mainly of officials with a technical background. However, representatives from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs also participated, either as members of the inspection team or as observers. The main sponsor of the trial inspection, the Ministry of Industry of the Czech Socialist Republic, paid thorough attention to the preparations for the experiment and to the establishment of all necessary conditions for its effective and instructive implementation. Special emphasis was placed on the thorough preparation of the facility attachment, since it soon became evident that the provisions included in the attachment would play an important "regulatory" role for the designation of areas or places to be inspected, as well as access by the inspectors and the conduct of the inspection itself.

The plant was visited six times between November 1988 and January 1989 before the facility attachment was finalized and concluded on 25 January. In its preparation maximum use was made of the provisions contained in the "Model for an agreement relating to facilities producing, processing, or consuming chemicals listed in schedule [2]" (CD/881, pp. 124-127). The inspection proper took two days. Its technical proceedings are described in detail in the report. The conclusions drawn from the inspection, which are specified in the report, might be summarized in the following way.

Firstly, the provisions relating to the verification of chemical industry facilities which have been developed so far in CD/881 can be considered as accurately reflecting the requirements for such verification. The national trial inspection convinces us that reliable verification of civilian chemical industry is feasible. At the same time, under normal conditions, the inspection is not exceedingly intrusive for the facility, or too demanding for the inspecting personnel, either in terms of participants or in terms of time. We hope that our experiment, together with the evaluation of other national trial inspections, will contribute to the completion of the verification provisions and procedures of the future chemical weapons convention.

Secondly, the participants in the inspection repeatedly realized the importance of the facility attachment. Attention paid to this kind of document in the previous work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has proved fully justified, since the facility attachment indeed plays the role of a "guide" to a facility, while at the same time protecting it from unnecessary intrusiveness and disclosures of confidential information. Two footnotes attached to the text of the Model on which facility attachments will be based indicate that some work on the material is still needed. We favour the initiation of such work as soon as possible.

Thirdly, the size of inspection teams will, in the course of real inspections, vary quite considerably, depending on the type of facility. It seems useful to envisage, in the case of larger inspection teams, specialization of its members. In view of the need to protect confidential information, the participants in the inspection came to the conclusion that access to all information should be limited to the head of the inspection team.

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Fourthly, certain conclusions, albeit only approximate ones, might be drawn with regard to time periods required for various operations. For instance, the elaboration and conclusion of a facility attachment will require about one week. The routine inspection itself could be carried out effectively within one or two days, depending on the type of facility inspected. The preparation of a final report on an inspection might take about five to seven days.

The first stage of the trial inspection of chemical industry, which I am speaking about, confirmed the timeliness and usefulness of the initiative on this matter advanced in February last year by the delegation of the USSR. As was said in the statement of the Government of Czechoslovakia issued on 5 January this year, we are prepared to participate in the second stage of the experiment, namely, inspections with the participation of international inspectors.

Allow me to add one short remark concerning our present proceedings. One of the valuable conclusions to be drawn from the experiment, as well as from the work of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament to date, as far as the future work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is concerned, is that it should be as specific and as goal-oriented as possible. What we need is not the redrafting of essentially agreed provisions, while some important issues are still unsolved in the "rolling text". In our view a pragmatic approach would now require concentration of our effort on the solution of these outstanding problems. In this spirit of practical work Czechoslovakia is prepared to provide information on facilities, laboratories and other scientific institutions producing or handling chemicals of relevance to the convention. We could start releasing such information soon.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. The next speaker is the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo.

Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure to see you presiding over the Conference this month. Sri Lanka has centuries-old ties with Japan and has an excellent relationship with your Government and people. That you are a personal friend and an able and wise diplomat well suited to preside over the Conference on Disarmament in this important month, makes it all the more a pleasure. I would also like to express my delegation's appreciation for the commendable leadership of Ambassador Aldo Pugliese over the Conference on Disarmament last month. Let me also welcome our guests, the student group from Yugoslavia who are with us today.

Dramatic developments have taken place in the recent past which logically should augur well for the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The INF agreement is well into the process of implementation under a verification régime that is unprecedented. The fear of negotiation has been overcome and has led to a bold new co-operative relationship between the super-Powers. This has gone a long way to calm the empty rancour of confrontation. In turn, this has rippled out to new agreed approaches by the super-Powers to certain regional issues, which has helped towards their solution or at least their

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amelioration. A flow of exchanges has commenced, including on nuclear and outer space issues. Unilateral reductions by the Soviet Union and socialist countries in their armed forces have been mooted.

On the broader multilateral canvas, we have seen the culmination of the CSCE review and the commencement of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, as well as the continuation of negotiations on confidence - and security-building measures, the latter with the participation of non-aligned and neutral States as well. There are also strong expectations of drastic reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals. Finally, in Paris in January this year 149 countries, by a remarkable act of consensus, together forged an unequivocal political commitment against chemical weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously remaining issues and to conclude the chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons was in many ways a product of the times, and the Government of France needs to be congratulated for articulating and vigorously pursuing an idea whose time had clearly come.

Some aspects about the Paris Conference require particular emphasis. Firstly, it was an endeavour in which 149 nations participated despite proclaimed differences in approach. In short, it was a genuine multilateral effort. Secondy, it was a multilateral exercise that ran simultaneously with ongoing efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to complete an effective ban on chemical weapons. It did not undermine, obstruct or complicate the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed, Paris showed that a broad-based, multilateral and - this is significant - clearly political approach need not upset the highly specialized negotiating process continuing in the Conference on Disarmament. Finally, the consensus reached at the Paris Conference was hailed throughout the world as a manifestation of political determination and will to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them.

The strong political message thus emerging from Paris should have found a corresponding echo in the Conference on Disarmament's work. In fact, a task of the Paris Conference was to positively influence the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament's task in turn was to respond to the challenge offered by the Paris document. The Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, the representative of Kenya, has already expressed our concern that the Conference on Disarmament's mandate was not adjusted and strengthened in such a way as to reflect more fully the international will clearly articulated at the Paris Conference.

Much of the success of the Paris Conference was due to the patient preparatory work undertaken by the French delegation, particularly our colleague Ambassador Pierre Morel, who now deservedly steers the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. His thematic or conceptual approach to negotiations takes us beyond the specific individual provisions of the "rolling text" and helps to give a clear perspective of the inter-relationship of different articles and provisions. In this way the convention can be envisaged as a balanced and integrated package which meets the concerns

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

of all countries. At the same time we should be cautious about any over-conceptualization that might lead to a loss of focus and shift emphasis away from treaty-oriented negotiation.

Discussions in the Working Group on Verification should not lead to a point where the convention is called upon to legislate for every single eventuality. Such an approach could pose restrictive burdens on small chemical industries, particularly in developing countries. We have requested the relevant authorities in Sri Lanka to study how our small chemical industry could respond to a non-production verification régime.

We would like to commend the Chairman of Group 5 for his suggestions with regard to the question of assistance and protection. The provisions in the convention on the question of assistance, together with those for technological co-operation, will help ensure wider adherence. We would like the envisaged Organization to be more actively involved in the provision of assistance and protection. Availability of assistance to a victim State through the envisaged Organization would be a practical and indeed effective manifestation of collective political will that should serve to deter attacks with chemical weapons. Timely protective assistance is essential. Chemical weapons have been used mainly against those who do not have the requisite protective capability. Affected countries should have the confidence to seek security through the convention's protective régime rather than through dubious attempts to develop their own chemical weapons capability. It is in this context that we understand the emerging agreement on the relationship between protection, assistance and the concept of undiminished security. A dependence exclusively on voluntary assistance would not afford the same degree of security as would the availability and provision of assistance through de-politicized mechanisms under the Organization.

I would now like to make some brief remarks on item 1 of our agenda - Nuclear test ban. A quarter-century has passed since the signing of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the partial test-ban Treaty - PTBT). The distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, in a statement made at the opening meeting of this spring session, surveyed international efforts spread over three decades in pursuit of multilateral negotiations to achieve a total ban on nuclear testing. It is a matter of regret that negotiations have not taken place since 1980 on this vital question, and that the intermittent work of the Conference on Disarmament within the framework of a subsidiary body during 1982-1983 was inconclusive.

The 1963 partial test-ban Treaty was conceived essentially as an interim measure in the process leading to a comprehensive test ban. The test ban itself, in turn, was placed in the overall context of "the principal aim of general and complete disarmament". Five years later, in a related move, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty was signed. Its preamble recalls the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 PTBT "to seek ... discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end".

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

Sri Lanka became a party to the NPT in the expectation that the Treaty would enhance the security of all States and contribute to international peace and security. A commitment to negotiate a total ban on nuclear testing was an integral part of the NPT consensus. Continued testing has been rationalized on various grounds. Test explosions are said to be necessary, inter alia, to refine and sophisticate weapon designs, to ensure the enduring reliability of stockpiled weapons and to guarantee their safety. Technical studies have, however, indicated that all these functions can be as effectively fulfilled without recourse to actual test explosions. However, the most important argument advanced by those advocating continued testing is of course that it is required to modernize and improve the lethality and accuracy of nuclear missiles and weapons systems so as to maintain that illusory "edge" over those of rivals.

The Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, stated in Vienna this year that "nuclear missile modernization is a step backward, not forward". The refinement of weapons increases the threat to the security of all nations and is a major obstacle to the pursuit of disarmament measures. The United States-Soviet bilateral talks on nuclear testing, though welcome per se as confidence-building measures, concentrate on regulating rather than eliminating testing. Moreover, bilateral talks of this nature, despite their undoubted scope, do not fully encompass the question of continued testing by other nuclear-weapon States. The imperative for a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been ackowledged and, as stated before, is embodied at least in spirit in the PTBT and the NPT, as well as in the Final Document of SSOD-I.

An unfortunate impasse has prevented the Conference on Disarmament from negotiating on item 1 of its agenda. There are indeed a number of proposals on the table to help finalize an adequate mandate for an ad hoc committee to commence substantive work on this item. While my own delegation has no rigid attitude, we would of course prefer the proposal of the Group of 21 in document CD/829, which does have some flexibility to facilitate a consensus that would meet the concerns of those who are wary about negotiating a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. The desire to get over this impasse in the Conference on Disarmament has led to the consideration of other measures as well. Such measures have been pursued without in any way seeking to duplicate the mandate and functions of the Conference on Disarmament or to question its central role in multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. Attention has been given to utilizing the provisions of article II of the PTBT, which contains provision for the consideration and possible adoption of amendments to the Treaty through a conference of parties.

Following an initiative by the delegations of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and my own delegation, action has been set in motion for the convening of a conference of treaty parties to consider an amendment proposal that would convert the PTBT into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The requisite number of signatures requesing a conference has I believe been obtained. The supporters of the amendment proposal see it more as a possible spur to the stalled work on the test ban in the Conference on Disarmament than an attempt to usurp its central function in multilateral negotiations. To illustrate this approach, one needs only to consider the acknowledged impact of the Paris Conference of January this year on the work of the Conference on Disarmament relating to the chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

An amendment conference would provide for a cross-pollination of differing approaches towards the fulfilment of the original promise held out in the preamble of the PTBT, which was to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. An eventual comprehensive test ban would also have a major impact on every aspect of nuclear disarmament and impose restrictions on the qualitative arms race and the development of new weapons systems, which would in turn contribute to creating a climate of greater confidence and security. Furthermore, the significance of an amendment conference in which would participate a number of States which are not parties to the NPT régime would be that a more favourable atmosphere would be created for its review Conference next year, and thereafter possibly for the renewal and the continuance of the NPT beyond 1995.

Finally, my delegation is glad that the Ad hoc Committee on outer space has been established. We regret that a bout of procedural wrangling is holding up substantive work. We are hopeful that the Chairman of the Committee will be successful in his negotiations. My delegation will revert to the subject of outer space in a later intervention.

In closing, I would like on behalf of my delegation to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Houllez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. The next speaker is the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, since I am taking the floor in plenary for the first time since the beginning of this month of March, permit me to extend to you our warmest congratulations on the occasion of your taking up the presidency of the Conference. Our wishes go to the distinguished representative of Japan, your great country, to the patient and skilled diplomat with whom we are familiar as well as to a colleague and friend of outstanding intellectual and human qualities. Through you, Sir, I would also like to extend our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, and thank him very much indeed for his substantial and able efforts during the month of February to start up the work of the session. I too would like to welcome among us His Excellency, Ambassador Aamo Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, and tell him how interested we were in his statement.

In my statement in plenary on 16 February 1989 I presented some views of a general nature on the status of the disarmament negotiations and major problems therein, as well as possible areas for action in the context of the Conference on Disarmament. On that occasion I stressed the importance of an integrated approach to disarmament, a comprehensive disarmament programme focused on nuclear disarmament and also including measures for the elimination of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as measures to bring about a substantial reduction in conventional weapons, military personnel and military budgets.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

Today, with your permission, I would like to make a few brief comments on problems covered by the first three agenda items on the Conference's agenda. In our view, nuclear disarmament remains an issue of the highest priority. The debates at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the resolutions adopted by the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, the realities and indeed the imperatives of interantional life oblige the Conference and all member States to act responsibly to discharge this urgent priority task. With respect to item 1 on our agenda, we reiterate our appeal for the immediate cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and for the initiation of negotiations on an agreement for a halt to the refinement of such weapons, with universal participation. As has already been stressed here, the international community should not allow the progressive development of nuclear weapons and the continuance of tests of such weapons to undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty. If nuclear-weapon testing continues, there is every reason to fear that the qualitative nuclear arms race will prevail over agreements concluded or currently being negotiated on the reduction of such weapons. Nor can it be forgotten that nuclear tests lead straight to a new generation of weapons. And one should not forget, in the euphoria of the various advances in the field of verification, which are most certainly to be welcomed, that the deadly threat which continues to hang over the very existence of mankind stems first and foremost from nuclear weapons.

We would like to take the opportunity once again to stress the importance of the initiative for the amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in order to extend it to the underground environment, where tests are currently carried out. We have never accepted the legitimacy of nuclear weapons, nor the jutifications - of whatever kind - on which they may rest. And we do not think that in recent developments there have been any changes that would lead us to modify our attitude. On the contrary, in view of what has occurred, we find the monopoly of a few countries over nuclear weapons and the efforts some of them are making to hang on to this monopoly and strenghten it even less acceptable. How can one continue to claim that a serious disarmament effort is underway when the sole United Nations multilateral negotiating forum is denied even the opportunity to discuss problems relating to nuclear weapons. The USSR and the United States of America have a special responsiblity in the field of disarmament, and they should be encouraged to pursue their bilateral nuclear arms reduction efforts. These efforts and the results therefrom are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a real, sustained and global disarmament process. They should not and cannot replace multilateral efforts by member States of the Conference on Disarmament and the international community as a whole. For the existence of nuclear weapons, their effects and also the impact of agreements for their reduction concern all countries. In this context I would like to remind you of our proposal of a universal treaty on the prohibition and complete step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a special body with the particiation of all the nuclear Powers, as well as other States, to negotiate such a treaty. The least that can be hoped is that the search will go on for an adequate framework for substantive consideration of item 2 of our agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", as well as item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

Lastly, we would like to take this opportunity to underscore the importance of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and the need to make substantial progress in this area, in particular bearing in mind the fourth conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Dolgu of Romania for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? There seems to be none.

May I now turn to another subject? The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. In this connection, I should like to recall that Friday 24 and Monday 27 March are official holidays for the United Nations Office at Geneva and, accordingly, there will be no conference services available at that time. Therefore, our timetable for the coming week covers up to Thursday 23 March, the date on which we shall hold our regular plenary meeting. The plenary meeting will be followd immediately by a meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. This arrangement means that there will be no meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on Thursday afternoon next week. In accordance with our practice, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if needed. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference agrees to the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 21 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.496
21 March 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

GE.89-60496/0137a

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 496th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning, may I welcome, on behalf of the Conference, the new head of the delegation of Kenya, His Excellency Ambassador Simon Bullut, who is attending this plenary meeting. Ambassador Bullut has been appointed by his Government to that important position and entrusted with the responsibility of presiding over the Conference during the month of April. In welcoming him, I should also like to pledge to our new colleague the co-operation of the Japanese delegation, in particular when he assumes the responsibilities of the presidency next month.

The Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". Nevertheless, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): I have asked for the floor today to speak on the item which in the view of my Government is the most important on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, that is the question of a nuclear test ban. However, before doing so, Mr. President, I should like to express the pleasure of my delegation at seeing you presiding over the Conference. With your personal skill, experience and commitment, the Conference is in very competent hands. It is a crucial month, not least when it comes to the question of the nuclear test ban, and I know that you are making great and constructive efforts to deal with this important matter. I also wish to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese for the excellent manner in which he conducted his task in the month of February. As I am speaking for the first time before the CD in my new capacity, I should like to thank all those colleagues who have welcomed me and assure them that I look forward to co-operating with them in the future.

For many years now the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted, with overwhelming majorities, resolutions regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, reaffirming the particular responsibility of this Conference in the negotiation of such a treaty It is a source of grave concern to my Government that the Conference has not been able to move forward on this momentous question. On the political level a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have a tremendous impact. Already the commencement of multilateral negotiations on such a treaty after so many years of stalemate on the item in the Conference would constitute a considerable step forward in the field of disarmament.

The importance of bringing an end to nuclear testing was acknowledged by three of the nuclear-weapon States in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. More than a quarter of a century ago they undertook to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that end. Further, in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. It is hard to conceive of any measure more conducive

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

to the cessation of the nuclear arms race than a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is appropriate to recall this in view of the forthcoming NPT review conference in 1990.

The Swedish Government considers that the non-proliferation Treaty is of pivotal importance, and that every effort must be made to sustain and strengthen that Treaty. The non-nuclear-weapon parties have done their share, but the nuclear-weapon Powers must do more to live up to the spirit of the Treaty, and especially its article VI. My delegation is convinced that a nuclear test ban would not only hamper vertical nuclear proliferation, but also strongly promote efforts to prevent the horizontal spread of these weapons. Continued vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons may endanger the future of the non-proliferation régime.

It is a positive development that the two leading nuclear-weapon Powers have engaged in bilateral talks on nuclear testing, but it is not enough. This is a matter that concerns all nations, and it should therefore be dealt with in a truly multilateral body. That forum is at hand, but so far the necessary political will to let it assume its responsibility is lacking. In the meantime the nuclear testing continues. Last year 38 nuclear explosions were conducted, 12 by the United States, 17 by the Soviet Union, 8 by France and 1 by China. Since nuclear testing significantly contributes to sustaining the nuclear arms race, partial or gradual approaches implying continued testing cannot be accepted by the great majority of States. In the view of my delegation, such approaches are acceptable only when directly linked to the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early and specified date.

It has been stated that a nuclear test ban should be considered a long-term goal only, and that it is more urgent to reduce nuclear-weapon arsenals. However, a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests would not only be the single most important step to slow down the qualitative arms race in this field and prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon Powers. It would also be a valuable complement to reductions in nuclear arsenals, as agreed quantitative cuts stand the risk of becoming offset by qualitative improvements. In fact, a comprehensive nuclear test ban would be instrumental in avoiding such a development. Thus, bilateral and multilateral action on arms reductions and disarmament can complement and mutually reinforce each other.

It goes without saying that in order to be effective, a nuclear test-ban treaty must be of global scope. It must also be adequately verifiable. It is a political question to define what capacities should be considered necessary for adequate verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. For several years it was argued that the absence of appropriate verification methods constituted the main obstacle in the realization of a nuclear test ban. However, technical developments have now made it possible to meet far-reaching verification requirements. Verification has therefore become a political rather than a technical issue.

The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has just concluded

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

its twenty-seventh session. The new global seismic verification system emerging as a result of the work of the expert Group is based on the exchange of wave-form and parameter data and the processing of such data at international data centres. This system will provide participating States with a compilation of globally collected high-quality data that will greatly facilitate the verification of a test ban. The ongoing large-scale technical test, approved by the Conference on Disarmament, will allow evaluation of the system's performance. For a successful test and for the final design of the system, the co-operation and support of a large number of countries around the globe are essential.

It has been proposed that a global seismic monitoring system should be put into routine operation to gain experience from the operation of an international monitoring system and to demonstrate achievable capabilities. Once the ongoing redesign and testing of the new system is concluded, this could be an interesting possibility. In addition to the establishment of a global seismic monitoring system, complementary verification measures will be needed. It is essential to improve the verification capability in selected critical areas, such as test sites or areas containing cavities or low-coupling ground material, where the seismic signals from explosions will be substantially reduced.

By establishing seismic stations around test sites, weak explosions, even below one ton, can be detected. On-site inspections by international teams of observers would enhance confidence further. The monitoring of earthquakes within the nuclear-weapon States can be improved through the use of networks of internal seismic stations. Measures and procedures to ascertain the authenticity of data from these stations are essential. On-site inspection, conducted upon invitation, should be used to confirm that large chemical explosions, for instance in mining operations, are non-nuclear.

In its draft CTB treaty submitted in 1983, Sweden proposed that a global system for monitoring atmospheric radioactivity should be established in order to provide an assurance that clandestine explosions are not conducted in the atmosphere. We must not design a verification system which provides an assurance against clandestine underground tests but is less capable of detecting atmospheric explosions. Satellite images of the surface of the Earth can give valuable contributions to the verification of a nuclear test ban by monitoring the infrastructure and other evidence of nuclear testing in selected areas, for instance existing test sites and areas where peaceful nuclear explosions have been conducted. Satellite data could also assist in the interpretation of seismic events which have not been positively identified as earthquakes through seismic data alone. If satellite data show that an event is located in an area which lacks the infrastructure - roads, for instance - necessary to conduct a nuclear explosion, the possibility of a clandestine test might be excluded.

Many verification arrangements will be critically dependent on the global and secure exchange of information. This political need cannot be met by

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

commercial telecommunication services controlled by a limited number of countries. In this context, a recent Swedish study of a special telecommunications satellite system may be of particular interest. I am referring to an independent data exchange satellite system which could be established for the sole purpose of exchanging data related to arms limitation and disarmament treaties. It would not only provide a tool for the global exchange of verification data but also secure the authenticity of reported data. For the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty, such a satellite system could facilitate special verification arrangements. It might be used for the direct and secure transfer of data from in-country monitoring stations and inspectors to international data centres, as well as to participating countries.

The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts provides an excellent forum for the establishment of a high-quality international seismic verification system. It may also be suitable for some additional tasks related to the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Expert deliberations are needed to pave the way for the implementation of such verification arrangements as on-site inspection and observation, the monitoring of airborne radioactivity and the use of satellite images for test ban verification. They give rise to technical and scientific questions similar to those presently addressed in connection with a global seismic system. My delegation, therefore, believes that it might be appropriate to ask the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to address these matters too.

The many efforts over the years to advance the nuclear test-ban issue in this Conference have hitherto been fruitless. Not even a mandate for an ad hoc committee has been agreed upon. My delegation finds the continued postponement of concrete work towards a nuclear test-ban treaty unacceptable. The efforts to elaborate different mandates in great detail have in fact created a stalemate in the Conference. Experience proves that a broad and far-reaching mandate sometimes yields only very modest results, while a comparatively weak mandate may be adequate to allow for considerable progress on substance.

During this session of the Conference several delegations from different groups have expressed flexibility as to the formulation of the mandate for an ad hoc committee. Whereas my delegation favours the mandate as recommended by the Group of 21 in CD/829, it also regards the compromise proposal in CD/863 as a viable approach, containing as it does a full commitment to a nuclear test-ban treaty. Given the impasse in the CD on the nuclear test-ban issue over the years, some States have requested that the matter should be dealt with through the convening of a conference to consider the amendment of the partial test-ban treaty. It is understandable that the frustration over the lack of progress in the CD has produced efforts to advance the issue elsewhere. My delegation, however, is of the opinion that it is in the Conference on Disarmament that the question should be dealt with. The CD is designated as the single multilateral body for disarmament negotiations. Action on the nuclear test ban must, therefore, be taken here, and now.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? There seems to be none.

As there is no other business for today, I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 23 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.